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Abstract
We construct a price-theoretic model of integration decisions and show that
these choices may adversely aect consumers, even in the absence of monopoly
power in supply and product markets. Integration is costly to implement but
is eective at coordinating production decisions. The price of output helps
to determine the organizational form chosen: there is an inverted-U relation
between the degree of integration and product prices. Moreover, organizational
choices aect output: integration is more productive than nonintegration at
low prices, and less productive at high prices. Since shocks to industries aect
product prices, reorganizations are likely to take place in coordinated fashion
and be industry specic, consistent with the evidence. Since the price range
in which integration maximizes productivity generally diers from the one in
which it maximizes managerial welfare, organizational choices will often be
second-best inecient. We show that there are instances in which entry of
low-cost suppliers can hurt consumers by changing the terms of trade in the
supplier market, thereby inducing reorganizations that raise prices.
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Do consumers have an interest in the internal organization of the rms that make the
products they buy? There are good reasons to believe that they do: the purpose of
organizational design is to in
uence the incentives of the rm's decision makers, and
that is bound to have an impact on the quantity and quality of goods that the rm
produces, as well as the prices at which they are delivered.
Since organizational design matters mostly when decisions made in the rm are
noncontractible, the real question is whether there is reason to expect that the forms of
organization that emerge are ecient in a second-best sense. Conventional economic
wisdom seems to answer arimatively, at least if product markets are reasonably
competitive: rms that do not deliver the goods at the lowest feasible cost, whatever
the reason, including inecient organization, will be supplanted by ones that do.1
On the other hand, the extensive literature on the theory of the rm raises sus-
picion against this view because it repeatedly identies situations in which some
stakeholders { most often shareholders { settle for second-best inecient contracts.
(Most often the eciency concept that is used reckons total surplus, not merely Pareto
optimality.)2 Consumers, however, have rarely been represented in the analysis, and
the connection between the eciency of contract choices and the standard economic
variables of prices and quantities has been given scant attention.3
To assess whether second-best ineciencies are likely to arise from the point of
view of all stakeholders, it is necessary to delineate how the market in
uences or-
ganizational design. In this paper we develop a simple competitive model in which
integration and transfer price choices are made to mediate managerial tradeos be-
tween organizational goals { prots { and noncontractible ones such as managerial
eort, working conditions, corporate culture, or leadership vision.
In our set-up, organization is in
uenced by product prices, because they aect the
terms of managerial trade-os. At the same time, as we have suggested, organizational
choice aects prices because it determines productivity. Even in a competitive world,
1\The form of organization that survives... is the one that delivers the product demanded by
consumers at the lowest price while covering costs." (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
2For examples of organizational and contractual failures to maximize surplus, see Aghion Bolton
(1987,1992); etc.
3Bolton-Whinston 1993, plus the old lit on verticval integration in IO which emphasizes market
power.
1ineciencies are likely to be signicant: both too much and too little integration
are possible outcomes. Consumers need not get the goods they want at the lowest
cost-covering price.4
To focus on eects of purely organizational origin, we rule out market foreclosure
altogether by assuming competitive product and supplier markets. The basic model
of an organization that we embed in this setting is an adaptation of the one in Hart
and Holmstr om (2002). Production of consumer goods requires the combination of
exactly two complementary suppliers, each consisting of a manager and his collections
of assets. When the suppliers form a joint enterprise (or \rm"), the managers operate
the assets by taking noncontractible decisions. While there is no objectively \right"
decision, output is higher on average the more decisions are in the same direction.
The problem is that managers disagree about which direction they ought to go.
This may re
ect dierences in background (engineering favors elegant design; sales
prefers user-friendliness and redundant features), information (a content provider
may want to broadcast mass-market programming, while the local distributor thinks
programs must be specically tailored to a local market), or technology (the BTU
and sulphur content of coal needs to be optimally adapted to a power plant's boiler
and emissions equipment). Each party will nd it costly to accommodate the other's
approach, but if they don't agree on something, the market will be poorly served.
Under non-integration, managers make their decisions independently, and this
may lead to low levels of output. Integration addresses this diculty via a transfer
of control rights over these decisions to a third party, called HQ; like the managers,
HQ enjoys prot, but unlike them, he has no direct concern for the decisions since
he is not involved in implementing them. Therefore he maximizes the enterprise's
output by enforcing a common standard.5 But integration does not come for free,
and generates two types of losses. First are costs imposed on the initial managers in
the form of a prot share for HQ and the private costs that HQ imposes on them.
Second, using HQ to enforce coordination may have direct costs in terms of reduced
output. For instance, HQ may lack expertise in the tasks carried out by the suppliers,
(e.g., Hart and Moore 1999), there may be additional communication and delay costs
4Obviously, organizational imperfections are essential for this result in a competitive market. In
the traditional IO literature, where rms are unitary prot maximizers, there is a gap between the
price and the marginal cost only when rms have market power.
5Other models that take a similar view of integration include Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and
Mailath et al. (2002).
2(e.g., Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), or HQ may have its own moral
hazard problems.
Whether to integrate is decided by managers when the rms form; this takes place
in a competitive supplier market in which the two types of suppliers \match". The
rms' output is sold in a competitive product market, wherein all rms and consumers
are price-takers.6
At low prices, managers do not value the increase in output brought by integration
since they are not compensated suciently for the high costs they have to bear. At
very high prices, managers value output so much that under non-integration they are
willing to forego their private interests in order to achieve coordination. Therefore
integration only emerges for intermediate levels of price. In other words, there is an
inverted U-shaped relationship between product price and the degree of integration.
Derivation of equilibrium organizational choices and product prices reduces to a
standard supply-and-demand analysis, where the industry supply curve embodies the
price-dependent organizational decisions described above. We apply this framework
to show how internal organization, as well as prices and quantities, respond to shocks
such as changes in product demand or imposition of a sales tax.
The price mechanism also provides a natural explanation for the tendency for
organizational restructuring to be widespread. There is considerable evidence that
rms integrate (or divest) in \waves" and that reorganizations of this sort are most
pronounced at the industry level. Since product price is common to a whole industry,
anything that changes it will not only have the classical price-theoretic quantity and
consumer welfare eects, but will have organizational eects as well. And as we have
suggested, these organizational eects will in turn feed back to quantity and welfare.
Incorporating organizational design into this otherwise standard analysis can also
lead to surprising results: for instance we identify regimes where product prices in-
crease and consumer welfare decreases following positive shocks, such as the entry of
low-cost suppliers.
A consumer welfare criterion would favor output-enhancing organizations, and
6The model is thus related to our earlier work (Legros and Newman 1996, 2008) that shows
how relative scarcities of dierent types of stakeholders determine aspects of organizational design
such as the degree of monitoring or the allocation of control. Those papers do not consider the
interaction of organization design with the product market. The formal treatment of the eects of
organizational design on consumer welfare is new as far as we are aware. Our focus on the eect of
prices on organizational design rather than the power of incentive schemes distinguishes our work
from earlier papers on competition and incentives, such as Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1997).
3there is a simple characterization of the prices at which the managers' organizational
choices fail this measure. If we use a total-surplus criterion, weighing consumer and
rm surpluses equally, the ineciency persists as long as managers are not full resid-
ual claimants and demand is suciently elastic. This begs the question of whether
outside owners can discipline managers into taking the prot maximizing organiza-
tional decision. We show that instruments such as variable prot shares, free cash

ow, or imposing the integration decision directly will not eliminate the ineciencies
{ and in some cases make things worse.
2 Model
There are two types of supplier, denoted A and B. To produce a unit of marketable
output requires the coordinated input of one A and one B, and we call their union
a rm. Examples of A and B might include game consoles and game software, up-
stream and downstream enterprises, or manufacturing and customer support. For
each provider, a decision is rendered indicating the way in which production is to
be carried out. For instance software can be elegant or user friendly, or a product
line and its associated marketing campaign can be mass- or niche-market oriented.
Denote the decision in an A supplier by a 2 [0;1]; and a B decision by b 2 [0;1]. It
is important that decisions made in each part of the rm do not con
ict, else there is
loss of output. More precisely, the enterprise will succeed with a probability propor-
tional to 1   (a   b)2, in which case it generates a unit of output; otherwise it fails,
yielding 0.
Overseeing each provider is a risk-neutral manager, who bears a private cost of
the decision made in his unit. The managers' payos are increasing in income, but
they disagree about the direction decisions ought to go: what is easy for one is hard
for the other, and vice versa. Specically, we assume that the A manager's utility is
yA   (1   a)2, and the B manager's utility is yB   b2, where yA  0 and yB  0 are
the respective realized incomes.7
Decisions are not contractible, but the managers have two contractual instruments
with which to resolve their interest con
icts. First, the rm's revenue is contractible,
allowing for the provision of monetary incentives via sharing rules. Second, the right to
7Although we model the managers disagreement as dierences in preferences, we expect very
similar results could be generated by a model in which they dier in \vision" as in van den Steen
(2005).
4make decisions can be contractually assigned. Here there are two options. Managers
can remain non-integrated, in which case they retain control over their respective deci-
sions. Alternatively, they can can integrate by engaging the service of a headquarters
(HQ).
HQ is empowered to decide both a and b, and is motivated only by monetary
concerns, incurring no direct cost from the decisions. Using HQ does impose a (social)
cost that we model as a reduction   0 in the expected output. One interpretation is
that this arise from a moral hazard problem: given its considerable decision power, HQ
may be able to divert resources into other activities, including private benets, other
ventures, or pet projects.8 Alternatively,  arises from added costs of communication,
additional personnel, or the use of decision makers who are less specialized than the
A and B managers. In this case, HQ gets a xed share of the revenue, with  being
(approximately) the sum of the output loss and HQ's share.9
Regardless of who determines a and b, managers bear the cost, because they have
to \live with the decision": their primary function is to implement them and to
convince their workforces to agree.10
To summarize, expected output is (1   (a   b)2)(1   I), where I, denoting the
ownership structure, is equal to one if the rm is integrated and zero if it is not.
Before production, B managers match with A managers in the supplier market,
signing contracts (s;I), that specify the ownership structure I and the share s 2 [0;1]
of managerial revenue accruing to the manager of A, with 1   s accruing to the B
(note that both receive zero in case of failure).
There is a competitive product market. Firms take the (correctly anticipated)
8For instance, suppose that after output is realized, there is a probability  that HQ has a chance
to divert whatever output there is to an alternative use valued at  times its market value, where
 <  < 1: If output is diverted, it doesn't reach the market, and the veriable information is the
same as if the rm had failed. Managers could prevent diversion by oering a share  to HQ, leaving
(1   ) of the revenue to be shared between the managers, but since  > ; it is actually better
for them to give HQ a zero share of market revenue and let him divert when he is able, so that
successfully produced output reaches consumers only (1   ) of the time.
9There is a small dierence between the interpretation in that in the rst case, the reduction in
output and the reduction in revenue perceived by the managers are identical, whereas in the latter
case, these dier by the amount of HQ's share; no substantial dierence in any of our conclusions
would arise if we were to take explicit account of this distinction.
10Logically speaking, there is an alternative form of integration which does without HQ, instead
delegating full control to one of the managers, who will subsequently perfectly coordinate the deci-
sions in his preferred direction. It is straightforward to show (section 2.2) that this form of integration
is dominated by the other forms in this model.
5price P as given when they sign contracts and take their decisions. The demand side
of the product market is modeled as a decreasing demand function D(P).
In the supplier market, there is a continuum of both types of suppliers. The A's
are on the long side of the market: their measure is n > 1, while the B's have unit
measure. All unmatched A managers receive an outside option payo uA, which we
take to simplify to be zero (the outside option of B-managers will play little role here
and can be taken to be 0).11
For now we take the total managerial revenue in case of success to be the product
market price P.
2.1 Integration
With integration, HQ receives an expected surplus proportional to (1   (a   b)2)P
and therefore chooses a = b; which maximizes the rm's expected revenue. Among
all a = b choices, the one that minimizes the total cost is a = 1=2; and we assume
that HQ will choose these decisions (indeed, as the managers' payos are perfectly
transferable by varying the share s, this choice is Pareto optimal among the rm's
decision makers). The cost to each manager is then 1













Total managerial welfare under integration is W I(P) = (1 )P   1
2 and, as we have
noted, is fully transferable.
2.2 Non-integration
Since each manager retains control of his activity, given a share s, A chooses a 2 [0;1];
B chooses b 2 [0;1] as the (unique) Nash equilibrium of a game with payos
u
N
A = (1   (a   b)




B = (1   (a   b)
2)(1   s)P   b
2:
11In fact it is a simple matter to generalize the model to the case of non zero and even heterogeneous












and the resulting expected output is
Q
N(P) = 1  
1
(1 + P)2 (3)
which is independent of s: Output is increasing in the price P : a higher product
price raises the relative importance of the revenue motive against private costs,and
this pushes the managers to better coordinate.





















Varying s; one obtains the Pareto frontier for nonintegration. It is straightforward





2 is maximized at s = 1=2 and minimized at s = 0 or
s = 1. Note that when s = 0; a = 1: the A manager makes no concession, and only
the B bears a positive private cost.12
2.3 Choice of Organizational Form
The overall Pareto frontier is the outer envelope of the integration and nonintegra-
tion frontiers. The relative positions of these frontiers depend on the price. Figure
1 depicts a situation in which neither integration nor nonintegration dominates. In-
stead, the organization the managers choose depends on where they locate along the
frontier, i.e., on the terms of trade on the supplier market: if the division of surplus
is unfavorable to the A, so that he obtains uA, the rm integrates; if the A receives
12Using WN(0;P) = P2=(1+P), it is now straightforward to show that giving B full control will
be dominated by nonintegration. For under B control, a = b = 0 and even assuming no additional
integration cost, the total surplus is P   1 which is everywhere less than WN(0;P).
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Figure 1: Frontiers and Organizational Choices
As the following proposition establishes, nonintegration may dominate integration
when product price is low or high, but integration never dominates nonintegration.
There is a range of prices where integration is preferred to nonintegration when B's
share of surplus is large enough.
Proposition 1 When  is positive, managerial welfare with integration
(i) is smaller than the minimum total welfare with nonintegration if and only if P does
not belong to the interval [;]; where  and  are the two solutions of the equation
 = P 1
2P(1+P):
(ii) is smaller than the maximum welfare with nonintegration.
It is straightforward to see that [;] is nonempty only when  is weakly smaller
than a positive upper bound  , that  is increasing and  is decreasing in , and that
 becomes unbounded as  ! 0.
2.4 Industry Equilibrium and the \Organizationally Aug-
mented" Supply
8Industry equilibrium comprises a general equilibrium of the supplier market and prod-
uct market. In the supplier market, an equilibrium consists of matches of one up-
stream rm and one downstream rm, along with a surplus allocation among all the
managers. Such an allocation must be stable in the sense that no (A,B) pair can form
an enterprise that generates payos to each manager that exceed their equilibrium
levels. In the product market, the large number of rms implies that the industry
supply is almost surely equal to its expected value of output given the product price;
equilibrium requires that the price adjusts so that the demand equals the supply.
For the rest of the paper, except for section ??, we will assume that the A agents
would earn zero if unmatched. Since they are in excess supply, their competitive
payo must be equal to zero. Then if frontiers are as in Figure 1, integration would
be chosen since it maximizes B's payo given that A gets zero. At other product
prices, the maximum payo to B may be generated through nonintegration. The
maximum payo for B under integration is equal to the total welfare (1   )P   1
2,
and the maximum payo for B under nonintegration is P2
1+P; corresponding to the
case s = 0 in (5). From Proposition 1, integration will be chosen by managers in
equilibrium only when P 2 [;]:
We note that output supplied to the product market under integration (1   ) is
smaller than output under nonintegration (1   1
(1+P)2) if and only if
 >
1








It is straightforward to see that  2 (;) whenever  < :
The reason nonintegration generates higher output as price increases is simple
enough: the higher is P; the more revenue gures in managers' payos. This leads
one to \ concede" to the other's decision in order to reduce output losses.
The non-monotonicity of managers' organizational preference in price when  2
(0;  ) is more subtle. At low prices, despite integration's better output performance,
revenue is still small enough that the managers (in particular the manager of B)
are more concerned with their private benets, i.e., they like the quiet life. At high
prices, nonintegration performs well enough in the output dimension that they do
not want to incur the cost  of HQ. Only for intermediate prices do managers prefer
9integration. In this range, the B manager knows that revenue is large enough that
he will be induced to bear a large private cost to match the perfectly self indulgent
A manager, who generates little income from the rm (s = 0) and therefore chooses
a = 1: B prefers the relatively high output and moderate private cost that he incurs
under integration.13
As mentioned earlier, the demand side of the product market is represented by
the demand function D(P): To derive industry supply, suppose that a fraction  of
rms are integrated and a fraction 1   are non-integrated. Total supply at price P
is then








For  <  ; when P < ;  = 0 and total supply is just the output when all rms
choose nonintegration. At P = ;  can vary between 0 and 1 since managers are
indierent between the two forms of organization; however because  < , output
is greater with integration and as  increases total supply increases. When  = 1
output is 1    and stays at this level for all P 2 (;): At P = , managers are
again indierent between the two ownership structures and  can decrease from 1 to
0 continuously; because  < , output is greater the smaller is . Finally for P > 
all rms remain non-integrated and output increases with P:
When    ; managers always choose nonintegration and  = 0 for all prices.
We therefore write S(P;(P)) to represent the supply correspondence, where (P)
is described in the previous paragraph. The supply curve for the case  2 (0;  ) is
represented in Figure 2. The dotted curve corresponds to the industry supply when
no rms are integrated.
An equilibrium in the product market is a price and a quantity that equate supply
and demand: D(P) 2 S(P;(P)): There are three distinct types of industry equilib-
ria, depending on where along the supply curve the equilibrium price occurs: those
13 For this outcome, it is crucial that A or B accrues the preponderance of the surplus. For
as we already noted, the total surplus under nonintegration when it is equally shared (s = 1=2)
always exceeds that generated by integration. Thus if surplus is (nearly) equally shared by A and
B; (for instance, if one side has a nonzero outside option), they never integrate. On the other hand,
our specic functional forms are not critical to this kind of outcome: similar results obtain if the
managers have a standard partnership problem, where total net revenue is Pf(a;b) and there are













Figure 2: Organizationally Augmented Supply Curve (Zero Outside Options,  < )
in which rms integrate (I), the mixed equilibria in which some rms integrate and
others do not (M), and a pure nonintegration equilibrium (N).14
The product market supply embodies organization choices by managers. The
model suggests that industries in which product prices are high or low will be pre-
dominately composed of non-integrated rms, while those with intermediate prices
will tend to be integrated.
The model is also useful for illuminating sources of changes in organization and
their welfare eects. The fact that all rms face the same price means that any-
thing that aects that price { a demand shift or foreign competition { can lead to
widespread and simultaneous reorganization, e.g., a merger wave or mass divestiture.
In particular, we can replicate textbook demand and supply shift analysis, with the
caveat that the change in price indicates also a change in organization. We can also
perform textbook welfare analysis to evaluate the eciency of equilibria. We turn to
these two points in the next section.
14As we show in section 4.2, introducing heterogeneity in types of HQs or in cash holdings of rms
will yield an OAS that is a function, rather than a correspondence, of the price level. It will be also
the case that there will be generic coexistence of organizational forms.
113 Normative and Positive Analysis of Organiza-
tional Choice
3.1 Welfare
Welfare analysis is straightforward if we use as criterion consumer welfare, i.e., the
area under the demand curve: managers choose integration ineciently when their
revenue  is in the interval (;) and choose nonintegration ineciently when their
revenue is less than . Thus as long as the welfare criterion puts enough weight on
consumer surplus, the equilibrium choice of organization will be inecient for some
prices.
Of course organizational choices should be evaluated taking account all of their
costs, which in this case includes the managers' private costs. For this reason, we
now use a total welfare measure that comprises the payos of all the rm's stakehold-
ers (consumers, shareholders, and managers). We compare the equilibrium welfare
with that would be generated a social planner could impose the level of integration.
For instance, we will say that the equilibrium with integration is second-best e-
cient if welfare exceeds that would could result if some rms were forced to choose
nonintegration while prices and surplus shares were determined by market clearing.15
It is convenient to express the managerial cost as a function of the expected
quantity produced by the rm. When there is integration, this cost is equal to
1=2. For nonintegration, in equilibrium the A's revenue shares are equal to zero
and they bear no cost since a = 1. Suppose that manager B chooses decision b. Since








For manager B, the solution to maxb (1   (1   b)2)   b2 is then the same as the
solution to maxQ Q   c(Q). It follows that along the graph (;QN()), we have
 = c0(QN()): when the manager faces revenue , expected output equates  to the
15A stronger concept of second eciency would also allow the planner to impose a share s. In
this case, it is welfare improving to set s = 1=2, which makes nonintegration more attractive and
therefore increased the region of prices for which integration is second-best inecient and makes the
nonintegration equilbrium second-best inecient for any price because the outside option of the A
is zero.
12marginal managerial cost.
In most rms, top managers accrue only a small share of the revenue. To re
ect
this situation, we assume that for any price P, managers have a revenue (P) = P,
where  < 1; the remainder accrues to the shareholders.16 While  is literally a share
of total revenue, it could be also construed as a crude measure of corporate governance;
large  mean that managers' interests are strongly aligned with those of other revenue
claimants, i.e., shareholders. When  is small, the resulting misalignment of interests
will lead managers to choose inecient organizations.
To see why such organizational ineciency is possible, rst observe that under
nonintegration, the managerial cost is equal to the area under the marginal cost
curve. On the other hand, since at the revenue level , managers are indierent
between integration and nonintegration, we have QN() c(QN()) = (1 ) 1=2;
thus the integration cost of 1=2 is equal to the area delimited by , c0(Q) and QI(P).
It is perhaps easiest to begin by considering a family of perfectly elastic demand
functions, since consumer welfare is then always zero. Start with the demand that
is perfectly elastic at the price =. Since managers receive , they are indierent
between integration and nonintegration. On the other hand, since QN() < 1   ;
shareholders would have larger incomes with integration than with any degree of
nonintegration, and any equilibrium in which some rms do not integrate is therefore
inecient. For demand below =, the unique equilibrium involves nonintegration,
and there are welfare gains from moving to integration; we have represented in Figure
3 the deadweight loss associatied to the inecient choice of organization for such a
level of demand.
Now consider a perfectly elastic demand at . In this case, the total welfare
under integration and nonintegration are equal when  = 1, however since QN() >
QN(), total welfare is strictly greater under integration at P =  when  < 1.
Hence, the lower bound on prices for which nonintegration dominates integration
is strictly greater than . Since as  increases, the supply under nonintegration
increases, this lower bound is increasing in . At  = 1 the lower bound is equal to
.
With perfectly elastic demands, the region of second-best inecient organizational
choices corresponds therefore to an interval of price (P N();=).
16The linear share is for simplicity; nothing depends on this assumption. As we will show in
section 4.1, with nonlinear compensation rules, the results generalize.
13If demand is not perfectly elastic, if all rms integrate the price may fall suciently
that the welfarare is lower than with nonintegration. However, if only a few rms
integrate, the drop in price is small enough that the there is a welfare gain. As demand
elasticity decreases, the deadweight loss from inecient nonintegration decreases.
Hence, demand elasticity plays a role here that is nearly opposite to that which
it plays in the theory of monopoly, where it is well known that the deadweight loss
is decreasing in the demand elasticity. Here, however, the organizational deadweight
loss is increasing in the elasticity. This suggests that the less we worry about market
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Figure 3: Second-Best Ineciency: Perfectly Elastic Demand
A similar argument shows that = is the upper bound of equilibrium prices at
which inecient integration obtains. The lower bound is strictly greater than =:
at this price, shareholders (and consumers) are indierent between the two forms of
organization, while managers strictly prefer integration. We can also show that the
lower bound is strictly greater than . Indeed, the total surplus of shareholders and
managers would be equal under the two forms of organization if  = 1; however since
14 < 1, nonintegration brings less surplus to the rm and integration dominates at
this price.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition. The proof for general
demand functions is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 There exist increasing functions P N(); P I(), with P N()   and
P I()  maxf;=g such that if P be the equilibrium price corresponding to a
demand function D.
(i) There is inecient nonintegration if and only if P 2 (P N();=).
(ii) There is inecient integration if and only if P 2 (P I();=).
(iii) As  = 1, equilibria are second best ecient.
3.2 Demand and Supply Shocks
In addition to welfare analysis, the model provides a simple framework for the positive
analysis of organizational choice. As an illustration, we consider the eects of \shocks"
to demand and to supply.
Assume that demand is increasing over time, beginning at a very low level in
which rms are nonintegrated, while supply remains constant. As demand grow, we
get some indication of how organization should be expected to evolve. When demand
is initially low and the product begins to mature, rms will begin to integrate and the
synergies will rst benet all stakeholders (managers, shareholders and consumers). As
demand continues to grow, integration becomes detrimental to consumers, and later,
when demand is high enough, we will observe a series of \divestiture" and the rms
will be nonintegrated.
In addition to the nonmonotonic relationship between prices and integration, this
simple exercice emphasizes the industry wide re-organizational choices. This seems
consistent with recent ndings by a number of authors who have emphasized the
empirical regularities surrounding \clustering" of takeovers and divestitures. For
instance, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that for the US at least, merger waves
are best explained empirically by the joint eects of macroeconomic and industry-level
variables. In particular, Powell and Yawson (forthcoming), looking at data from the
UK, emphasize growth in sales and foreign competition as important determinants of
takeovers, while divestitures are associated with negative demand shocks.
15Beyond structural shifts in supply and demand, taxation is another source of shifts
in demand and supply. In our model, tax incidence will have the usual properties:
ad-valorem taxes decrease the welfare of buyers and sellers, and there is neutrality of
tax burden. What is new however are the organizational consequences of taxation:
the shift in demand or in supply may lead to a new equilibrium that involves a new
organizational structure in the economy. As far as we know, while the literature
has tried to identied the eects of taxation on the form of incorporation, there has
been little research linking the level of taxation on consumer goods or on prots and
integration decisions by rms.
Another channel of coordinated reorganization is the supplier market: changes
in the relative scarcities of the two sides, or to outside opportunities on one side,
will change the way surplus is divided between managers, and this too will lead to
reorganization.17 In some cases, these changes in the supplier market terms of trade
will have surprising eects on product market outcomes. Suppose that it costs the A
a xed amount ! to participate in joint production with B; who continues to have
zero costs. We want to study the contracting choice in this situation and compare it
to the case in which A has a cost !0 < !:18
Think of contracting with an A manager with a plant that could fetch a prot of
! in some other use. The contracting problem is very similar to what we have done
before with the caveat that A must now be assured of an expected payo of !.
As is apparent from Figure 1, for levels of ! that are suciently high, noninte-
gration will be chosen. As A's opportunity cost decreases, it becomes feasible (and
optimal) for the B to integrate with A. Hence, if at price P integration is optimal
at cost !; it will be also be optimal for any !0 < !; because the preference is strict
at !0 when there is indierence at !, there are more prices for which integration is
preferred under !0. Thus, if sharing rules are employed, reduced costs are a force
toward integration. This is represented in Figure 4.
Of particular interest when low-cost suppliers enter the market is whether the
resulting cost savings are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. As
shown in the gure, this need not be the case: if prices are initially moderately high,
the reorganization used to accomodate the changing terms of trade in the supplier
17See Legros and Newman (2008) for a detailed analysis of this mechanism.
18We focus on situations where ! is `small' in the sense that for the range of prices we consider !
is less than half the maximum surplus under nonintegration.
16Q
P
Figure 4: Entry of lower cost suppliers (!0 < !) leads to a price increase
market (i.e., a move toward integration) leads to a reduction in output and an increase
in prices. When demand is low, though, entry of low-cost A's yields the the usual
comparative static of lower prices and higher quantities.
4 Shareholders and the Managerial Market
In our competitive world, when the managers are not full residual claimants, share-
holders have nearly the same interests as consumers: they value output enhancing
organizations. Corporate control by outside owners or the characteristics of the mar-
ket for HQs in
uence the opportunity costs of integration and may therefore mitigate
the ineciencies we have identied in the previous sections.
We rst consider the possibility for the shareholders to use general, rather than
linear, compensation rules for the managers and also to have a voice in the integration
decision. As we show, this generalization does not eliminate ineciencies, but in fact
sometimes magnies them. We then introduce heterogeneity in the model, rst in
cash holdings and second in the types of HQs available in the market. In both cases,
the qualitative results of the basic model are preserved.
174.1 Price Contingent Compensation and Shareholder Activism
We assume here that owners can choose managerial shares (P) that are contingent
on the market price P. We will consider rst the situation where managers are
delegated the right to decide integration or nonintegration. We will then analyze the
case where the owners have full control on the organization.
4.1.1 Managers Choose the Organization
Suppose that owners want the managers to choose integration: the cheapest way for
them to do so is to give a xed compensation in case of success of  (or  greater than
this to avoid indierence). Hence, the maximum payo to owners when they want to
implement integration is
v
I(P) = (1   )(P   )
Suppose now that the owners want to implement nonintegration. They are con-
strained in their choice since they need to choose  that is not in the interval [;].
Let us, however, ignore the constraint for the moment. The value under nonintegra-









(P   ) (9)
Lemma 3 The solution N(P) to (9) is a strictly convex and strictly increasing
function of P. The value vN(P) is strictly increasing and convex.
Proof. The objective is strictly concave in  and strictly supermodular in (;P); so
that the (unique) optimum N(P) is increasing in P. Consequently, QN((P)) is also
increasing, and there exist unique values of prices P;P ; and P such that  = (P),
 =  (P ), and  = (P). Since by the envelope theorem vN0(P) = QN((P)),
vN(P) is (strictly) convex.
Convexity of vN, linearity of vI and the fact that for prices less than 1 integration
leads to a negative payo while nonintegration always leads to a positive payo,
imply that there is an intermediate region of prices for which integration is preferred
by the owners. Since owners cannot decide on the organization, they have to take
into account the fact that the compensation of the managers cannot be in the interval
(;) if they want to implement nonintegration. Taking into account this constraint
18may force the owners to distort the compensation from its optimal value N(P) under
nonintegration, as illustrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (1) Suppose  < . There exists two price levels P0 < P and P1 
P , where N(P) = ;N(P ) =  with N(P) dened in Lemma 3 such that the
compensation to the managers and their choices of organization are as follows:
(i) There is integration if P 2 [P0;P1] and the compensation is  for all prices in this
region
(ii) There is nonintegration for the other prices and the compensation is
(P) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
N(P) if P < P0
 if P 2 [P1;P]
N(P) if P > P:
(2) Suppose that  > . Managers face a compensation scheme N(P) and choose
nonintegration.
The analysis therefore shows that when shareholder optimize, they will decide to
keep the organizational form that is not output maximizing because it is too costly
to provide incentives when P < P0 and when P 2 [P ;P1). Note that the industry
supply curve is similar to the case dealt with in section 4 (with = replaced by
P0 and = replaced by ^ P1) and that ranges of both inecient nonintegration and
inecient integration persist.
Remark 5 Because P0 is likely to be larger than  when a rm has a large capital-
ization, integration arises at higher product market prices than when managers have
full residual claim on the revenue.
4.1.2 Owners Choose the Organization
If owners can also choose the organization as a function of the price, they can disso-
ciate the choice of compensation from the organization choice.
For integration, they save on incentive costs, since they have only to cover the
managerial cost of 1=4 and their total prot is now
^ v
I(P) = (1   )P   1=2; (10)
19with ^ vI(P) > vI(P) for all P.
Since the best payo under nonintegration is given by vN(P) in (9), it is immediate
that the owners will now choose to implement integration for a larger set of prices
when  < . If  > , by denition of , owners cannot benet from integration even
if they give managers the minimal compensation consistent with them covering their
costs.
Corollary 6 Suppose that owners can impose the organization.
(1) If  < , integration is chosen if, and only if, P belongs to the interval [ ^ P0; ^ P1],
^ P0 < P0, ^ P1 > P1.
(2) If  > , managers face compensation scheme (P) and choose nonintegration.
Note that when P 2 ( ^ P0;P0), managers will choose nonintegration by Proposition
4 while owners prefer integration. If corporate governance does not allow existing
owners to impose organizational changes, a price in this interval may trigger an hostile
takeover whereby the raider puts in place an integrated structure. For other prices
however, nonintegration decisions are immune to takeovers, even if they are second-
best inecient.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) provide evidence that managers prefer a \quiet
life" at the possible expense of productivity-enhancing integration. The corollary
shows that even if owners can make organizational decisions, managers may enjoy a
quiet life { with a second-best inecient organization { because it is too costly for
owners to implement integration.
4.2 Heterogeneity and Coexistence of Organizational Forms
We introduce two sources of heterogeneity: one linked to the ability of shareholders
to transfer lump sum amounts to their managers, the other linked to dierences in
types of HQs.
4.2.1 Free Cash Flow
One important dierence between integration and nonintegration is the degree of
transferability in managerial surplus: while managerial welfare can be transferred 1 to
1 with integration (that is one more unit of surplus given to B costs one unit of surplus
to A), this is no longer true with nonintegration. This explains why the organizational
choice will not necessarily coincide with that maximizes the total managerial welfare.
20This is no longer true if the managers have access to cash, or other free cash 
ow
that can be transferred without loss to the B manager before production takes place,
since in this case the advantage of integration in terms of transferability is reduced.19
Indeed, under nonintegration, cash is a more ecient instrument for surplus allocation
than the sharing rule s since a change of s aects total costs. By contrast, when rms
are integrated, a change in s has no eect on output or on costs and therefore shares
permits as ecient an allocation of surplus than cash. Hence, the introduction of
cash favors nonintegration and we should observe in equilibrium a smaller number of
rms that are integrated.
Large cash holdings will make transactions between rms more ecient. How-
ever there is no reason to expect that what is \more ecient" for managers is also
best for consumers. And indeed, as we will see, when cash holdings are suciently
large, nonintegration is always chosen, and this implies that the region of inecient
nonintegration | from consumers' view point { expands.
To simplify, assume that the owners are forced to use linear compensation rules
with managers, that is that for each price P, the managers receive P, where  <
1. The range of market prices for which managers choose integration is therefore
[=;=]
Consider a distribution of cash F(l) among the A managers, where
R
dF(l) = n >
1, and let lF be the marginal cash, that is there is a measure n of A managers with
cash greater than lF
F(lF) = n   1:
There is no loss of generality in assuming that only A rms with cash greater than
lF will be active on the matching market.
Since there is a measure n 1 of A units that will not be matched, A managers will
try to oer the maximum payo consistent with being matched with a B unit while
getting a nonnegative payo. Fix the product price at P. The maximum surplus that
a B manager can obtain via integration is (1   )P   1=4. The maximum he can
obtain when the sharing rule is s is W N(s;P); however this can be achieved only if
19Jensen (1986) argued that cash 
ow can lead managers to choose projects with a low rate
of return, and in particular may lead to rm growth beyond the \optimal" size, i.e., excessive
integration. Our analysis points out the possibility of a distortion in the opposite direction, namely
that managers will use their cash to avoid integration, possibly leading to rms size that is below
the optimum. Legros and Newman (1996) and (forthcoming) discuss the role of cash in equilibrium
models of organizations.
21the A manager has cash at least equal to N
A(s;P) that can be transfered ex ante to
B.
We have three regimes. First, when P  ; or when P  ; integration is
dominated by nonintegration (Lemma 1) and therefore cash has no eect on the
supply curve: each rm produces QN(P) = 1   1
(1+P)2 and the role of cash is to
increase managerial surplus since the transfer of cash enables rms to choose s closer
to 1/2.




Then, assuming that the A managers have a zero outside option, manager B is indif-
ferent between using integration with a share of s = 0 to A or using nonintegration




If l < L(P); the maximum payo to a B manager is less with nonintegration and an
ex ante transfer of l than with integration. Hence, all A rms with l  L(P) will still
oer integration contracts in order to be matched; however, rms with l > L(P) will
oer nonintegration contracts.
The measure of rms that integrate is the measure of A managers with cash greater
than L(P). Hence, there is a measure F(L(P))   F(lF) = F(L(P))   n + 1 of rms
that integrate and a measure of n   F(L(P)) of rms that do not integrate. With
cash there is a smaller measure of rms that integrate, and because the output with
integration is larger than with nonintegration when P < = we conclude that the
supply curve rotates at =, as illustrated in Figure 5 and the next proposition
Proposition 7 With cash, the supply curve coincides with the no cash case when
P = 2 (=;=): When P 2 (=;=) the supply curve is shifting in and when
P 2 (=;=) the supply curve is shifting up.
Going back to the characterization of the con
ict between managers and the other
stakeholders we note two opposite eects of cash. First, there is less often inecient
integration in the region P 2 (=;=) and therefore output is larger and prices
lower. Second, there is more inecient nonintegration since rms stay non integrated






Figure 5: The eect of cash
is output maximizing in this region, ineciencies increase from the point of view of
consumers and owners. This result is squarely in the second-best tradition: giving the
managers an instrument of allocation that is more ecient for them may induce them
to minimize their costs of transacting, but this may exacerbate the ineciency of the
equilibrium contract. Here while cash reduces the over-internalization of the benets
of coordination, it increases the over-internalization of the benets of specialization.
This role of cash seems new to the literature.
4.2.2 Heterogeneous HQs types 
Assume that HQs have type  with distribution function F; suppose they all have
the same outside option u > 0. We dene F by
F(F) = 1
Hence if all rms choose integration, the `marginal' HQ has type F.
A rm using integration with a HQ of type  generates a total surplus of (1  
)P   1
4   u, while the surplus with nonintegration is the same as in the text. It








Now, if the managers are willing to hire an HQ of type  and pay him a compensa-
tion of h, they are also willing to hire an HQ of type 0 and give him a compensation
h0 such that (1 )(1 h) = (1 0)(1 h0). In fact, since (1 0)h0 = (1 )h+ 0,
it must be the case that all HQ with type less than  are hired. An equilibrium will
therefore specify a marginal HQ type  such that F() is the measure of integrated
rms.
Proposition 8 Suppose that u < 1=2; let P 0 be the maximand of (P;u).
(i) If F < (P0;u), all rms choose nonintegration.
(ii) If F > (P0;u), there exist (F);(F;u) solving (P;u) = F, such that a
measure F (minfF;(P;u)g) integrate and the other rms choose nonintegration.








Figure 6: Marginal HQ: minfF;(P;u)g
The OAS will appear similar to the one depicted in Figure 5. As long as F(F) <
1, we will have coexistence of integration and nonintegration for almost all prices.
Except for this dierence, we have the same qualitative properties as before: for
low prices, integration would be preferred by consumers (and shareholder) but is not
24chosen by managers, while for middle prices integration is chosen while nonintegration
would lead to a higher level of output.
5 Conclusion
In many models of organization, managers trade o pecuniary benets derived from
rm revenue against private costs of implementing decisions. In our model, two key
variables aect the terms of this trade-o: product prices, over which managers have
no control, and the choice whether to integrate, over which they do. In particular,
nonintegration performs well from the managerial point of view under both high and
low prices, while integration is chosen at middling prices.
At the same time, organizational choices also aect production: nonintegration
produces relatively little output compared to integration at low prices, as managers
prefer a \quiet life"; at certain higher prices, integration can be less productive than
nonintegration, despite being preferred by managers. Thus, organizational decisions
rendered by managers acting in their own interests can lead to lower output levels and
higher prices than would occur if they were forced to act in consumers' interests. This
result is obtained even with a competitive product market, i.e., rms or managers do
not take into account the eect of reorganization or vertical integration on product
prices.
We believe that these eects can be identied in practice. For instance, the model
can identify conditions under which \waves" of integration are likely to occur { e.g.,
growing demand in an initially non-integrated industry { or when opening borders to
low cost suppliers might lead to increased product prices. More generally, as prices,
quantities, and integration decisions are easily measured, we are hopeful that models
such as the present one will encourage empirical investigations that will quantify the
real-world signicance of the eects of prices on organization and vice versa.
Our analysis raises the issue of what policy remedies might be indicated to im-
prove consumer welfare. It is likely that these policies may be unconventional. For
instance, in the case of inecient integration (where output would be higher under
nonintegration), standard merger policy implemented by an antitrust authority that
blocks a potentially harmful merger may be eective in increasing output and low-
ering market prices. But the policy is surely unconventional, in the sense that it
does nothing to enhance competition, which by assumption is perfect both before
25and after a proposed merger { thus it is unlikely that the antitrust authority would
be called upon to act. In the range of prices in which managers ineciently opt not
to integrate, conventional merger policy is rather ineective { there is no merger to
prevent.
Instead, the model suggests a novel benet of corporate governance regulation: in
competitive markets, strengthening owners' ability to force appropriate integration
decisions may improve consumer welfare as well as shareholder interests. In our
competitive world, shareholder and consumer interests are (nearly) aligned since they
both would value higher levels of output. However, as we have shown, even if owners
control organizational choice, their interests will typically diverge somewhat from
those of consumers.
Notice in particular that governance matters at low prices (and protability levels)
in this model, when there is ineciently little integration, as well as at medium-high
ones, where there is inecient integration. This is in contrast to much literature
on corporate governance, which emphasizes high prot regimes as most conducive
to managerial cheating. Presumably, this is because high prot regimes are most
conducive to \prot taking," diversion of revenues to private managerial benets or
investments in pet projects. Our analysis underscores that governance also matters for
\prot making": proper organizational design aects managers' production decisions,
and is particularly important when low protability provides weak incentives for them
to invest in a prot or output maximizing way.
Though the eects we have identied can occur absent market power, this is not
to say that market power is irrelevant to the eects of { or its eects on { major
organizational decisions. When rms have market power, incentives to integrate may
be also linked to eciency enhancements, such as the desire to eliminate double
markups. However rms may also recognize that by reducing output they will raise
prices, and some of the eects we describe happen all the more strongly.
Moreover, the impact of \eective" corporate governance may be quite dierent
in this case. In a noncompetitive world, owners and consumers interests are no
longer aligned, and as we have already noted, managerial discretion may be a way
for owners to commit to low output and therefore high prots. The relative eects
of corporate governance regulation and competition policy may therefore depend non
trivially on the intensity of product market competition. These points warrant further
investigation.
266 Appendix
6.1 Proof of the Claim in Footnote 13
Consider a specication Pf(a;b) and increasing costs CA(a), CB(b). Assume that
CB(0) = 0 and that f(a;b) is strictly increasing in a;b and has an upper bound of
y. We prove the claim that there is nonintegration at low and high prices and that if
integration is used, it must be for intermediate values of price.
Assume that the long side managers have a zero outside option and therefore that
the payo to the short side managers (B) is the total welfare.
We show that either nonintegration is always preferred to integration for low values
of P and for large values of P.
With integration, HQ chooses a;b to maximize f(a;b). Assume that HQ chooses
the cost minimizing solution (aI;bI) if there is more than one optimum solution.
Payo to the B manager is uI
B(P) = Py(1   )   CA(aI)   CB(bI), where y is the
maximum output.
With nonintegration, the short side chooses s to maximize (1 s)Pf(a;b) CB(b)
where (a;b) is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by s. Let uN
B(P) be the optimal
value for B. If uN
B(P) > uI
B(P) for all P, there is nothing to prove. If however there
exists P such that integration is preferred to nonintegration we show that necessarily
nonintegration is preferred to integration for large values of P.
As P = 0, the Nash equilibrium is a = b = 0 and B has a zero payo; therefore for
low prices nonintegration is preferred to integration. For P > 0, the payo uN
B(P) is
greater than what B can achieve with s = 0. If s = 0, for any P a Nash equilibrium
requires a = 0. Let b(P) be the solution of maxa Pf(0;b)   CB(b). The payo to B
when s = 0 is then vB(P) = Pf(0;b(P))   CB(0;b(P)) and by the envelop theorem,
v0
B(P) = f(0;b(P)). Note that b(P) is strictly increasing in P, and therefore that
v00(P) = b0(P)f2(0;b(P)) > 0. Hence vB(P) is convex increasing in P. Because
dvI
B(P)=dP = y(1   ), there exists b such that f(0;b) = y, and therefore there
exists P  such that b(P ) = b and v0
B(P) > y(1   ), for all P > P . This shows
that for P large enough uN
B(P)  vB(P) > uI
B(P), as claimed.
276.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Managerial welfare under integration is smaller than the minimum managerial
welfare under nonintegration when



















2 + (2   1)P + 1 > 0;
which holds whenever P is outside the interval [;]; where  and  are the two
solutions of the equation  = P 1
2P(1+P):
(ii) Managerial welfare under integration is always smaller than the maximum non-
integration welfare. From (5), maximum welfare under nonintegration is obtained at
s = 1=2; and welfare with integration is smaller than this maximum welfare when























which is true for all nonnegative  since the right hand side is negative for all values
of P.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) From the text, the lower bound P N() on prices for which nonintegration is not
second-best ecient is lower than . The result has been established in the text when
the demand function is perfectly elastic. We consider here the general case. Consider
a demand function yielding an equilibrium price Pa 2 (P N();=). Consider the
supply function as in (8) when  rms integrate. Let P() the equilibrium price with
this supply function: S(P();) = D(P()). As long as Pa 2 (P N();=), there
exists  > 0 such that P() 2 (;=) and P()  c0(QN(Pb)). See gure 7 where










QN(P) : P = c0(Q)
(1   )QN(P) + QI(P)
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The variation in total welfare is therefore





















where Pa is the initial equilibrium price (at point a in the gure). This can be
29rewritten as



















The rst term is positive since welfare continuously increases when the price de-
creases towards the marginal cost. By standard arguments, as long as demand is
elastic, the consumer surplus satises:
Z Pa
P()
D(p)dp > (Pa   P())Q
N(Pa)
















Since P() 2 (P N();=), the dierence is positive by our previous observation
that moving to full integration is welfare maximizing when demand is perfectly elastic
in this range of prices.
(ii) Consider rst a demand that is perfectly elastic. We have represented in
gure 8 a typical case. At price Pa, going from integration to nonintegration, there
is rst { keeping total output constant at 1    { an additional cost corresponding
to the area edf but there is an increase in quantities produced and the surplus going
to shareholders and managers increases by the area abcd. Since this area is strictly
increasing in Pa, there exists indeed a unique price Pa such that total surplus for
integration and nonintegration are equal. At this price, areas edf and abcd are equal.
Hence for perfectly elastic demand functions, integration prices are inecient if and
only if they are in the interval (P I();=].
Suppose now that the demand going through a is not perfectly elastic. There exists















Figure 8: Integration is Second-Best Inecient
that D(P()) = S(P;1   ). The variation in welfare is









+ (1   )
Z Pa
P()
D(p)dp + (P()   Pa)(1   )

Again, it is straightrforward to show that
R Pa
P() D(p)dp > (Pa   P())(1   ).
Hence, the second term in the above welfare dierence is positive. Substituting the
lower bound for the consumer surplus in the rst term we obtain P()QN(P())  
c(QN(P()))   P()(1   ) + 1
2, which is positive since we know that for perfectly
elastic demand functions in the interval (P I();=), total welfare is greater with
nonintegration. This proves (ii).
(iii) As  = 1, P N(1) =  and therefore the interval (P N();=) converges to the
empty set. Since P I() >  for  < 1, P I(1)  , but then the interval (P I();=)
31converges to the empty set.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4






(P    ) = (1   )(P    ) < (1   )(P    ); since
 < : Moreover, the marginal payos satisfy vN0(P ) = vI0(P ) = 1   ; thus for
P > P ;vN0(P) > vI0(P); and for P < P ;v0
N(P) < v0
I(P) and we conclude that
vN() = vI() at two prices P0 and P 0
1; with 0 < P0 < P  < P 0
1: Since QN() < 1   ;
vN(P) < vI(P): Therefore, P0 < P:
As for P 0
1 however, we do not know if it is greater than P. If it is, then (P 0
1) > 
and managers will indeed choose nonintegration if they are oered the compensation
(P 0
1); using P1 = P 0
1 proves the result.
If however (P 0
1) < , managers will choose integration while owners want to
implement nonintegration.20 If the owners are implementing nonintegration, they
must oer a compensation  = 2 (;) for prices in the interval [P;P]. Remember that
the slope of vN(P) is QN(). It follows that using a compensation  cannot be optimal
since integration dominates (the graph of the payo function QN()(P  ) is tangent
to the graph of vN(P) at P = P and is therefore strictly lower than vI(P) for prices
greater than P.) For a compensation of  however, the payo with nonintegration
is equal to the integration payo for a price P1 in the interval (P 0
1;P), proving the
result.
(2) If  > , managers always prefer nonintegration and the result follows.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 8
The Proposition follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9 A measure F(minfF;(P;u)g) integrate, the other rms choose nonin-
tegration:
(i) If (P;u)  F, all rms integrate and the marginal HQ type is F
(ii) If (P;u) > F, a measure F((P;u)) rms integrate and the marginal HQ is
(P;u) and a measure 1   F((P;u)) choose nonintegration.
Proof.
20The necessary and sucient condition for having P0




32Note rst that the highest type HQ that is hired in integrated rms has type
  (P;u). Indeed, if  > (P;u), that type has a payo equal to his outside
option u, but then by denition of (P;u), managers A;B strictly prefer to not
integrate rather than integrate with an HQ .
(i) By denition of (P;u), managers are indierent between all HQ with types
less than that of the marginal HQ. Since at  < (P;u) managers strictly prefer
integration, it follows that all rms integrate and that the marginal type of HQ is
indeed F.
(ii) If F > (P;u) , by our initial remark, managers integrate only with HQ types
less than (P;u). The result follows.
We then establish single peakedness of the function (P;u) when u < 1=2.
Lemma 10 For any u < 1=2, the function (P;u) is single peaked in P and is
positive for some prices.
Proof. Clearly, from 11, (P;u) is positive only if u is small enough; in particular we
need u < 1=2. The variation of (P;u) with respect to P has the same sign as that









1 2u . If u < 1=2, then P1 < 0 < P0; since the quadratic has opposite
sign to that of (P  P0)(P  P1), it is positive when P < P0 and negative when P > P0
and therefore (P;u) is single peaked, with a maximum at P0. It follows that for a
given F < (P0;u), there are two prices at which F = (P;u), and we call these
prices (F;u);(F;u).
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